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Al-Qaeda exploits wars that involve Muslims to sustain its power. It features 
these wars in its propaganda, and uses them as occasions to recruit and train 
new fighters, raise money, and network with other extremist groups. For these 
reasons wars that involve Muslims are a tonic for al-Qaeda and a threat to U.S. 
efforts to defeat al-Qaeda.1 Conflicts that do not involve Muslims can also help 
al-Qaeda by causing states to quarrel among themselves instead of cooperating 
to defeat al-Qaeda, or cooperating to limit the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) that al-Qaeda seeks to acquire.
Hence the U.S. has a major interest in preventing, abating, or ending many 
international and civil conflicts. Peacemaking should therefore be a key U.S. 
weapon in the war on al-Qaeda. Accordingly, the U.S. government should 
consider ways to develop more capacity for peacemaking. Specifically, the U.S. 
should seek ways to translate its vast military and economic power into peace-
ful conduct by others. America’s military and economic strength gives it large 
power to shape others’ conduct. U.S. policy thinking should focus on finding 
ways to apply this leverage to prevent or dampen conflicts that involve Muslims 
or that otherwise harm U.S. security.
I. War Begets Terror
Al-Qaeda arose as a byproduct of five wars in the Middle East and South Asia, 
and is now sustained by four current conflicts. Without these wars al-Qaeda 
would likely not exist—a fact that highlights the U.S. interest in ending current 
conflicts and preventing new ones.
The Soviet-Afghan war of 1979 to 1989 was the petri dish in which the 
Egyptian Muslim brothers led by Ayman al-Zawahiri and Saudi Islamist radicals 
led by Osama bin Laden combined to form al-Qaeda, and the place where they 
first gained combat experience. The India-Pakistan conflict (1947–) led Pakistan 
in 1994 to create and aid the Afghan Taliban, which Pakistan viewed as a tool 
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to forestall the possible growth of Indian influence in Afghanistan. The ruinous 
Afghan civil wars of 1989 to 1996 persuaded many Afghans to accept barbaric 
Taliban rule in 1996 as the only alternative to the chaos of war. And the war 
between the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan Northern Alliance from 1996 to 
2001 led the Afghan Taliban to grant safe haven to al-Qaeda, in exchange for 
al-Qaeda’s help against the Northern Alliance.
These four wars led to the founding of al-Qaeda, motivated others to create 
and support its Afghan Taliban allies, and motivated the Afghan Taliban to ally 
with al-Qaeda. The Persian Gulf conflict of 1990 to 1991 also fueled al-Qaeda’s 
growth by drawing U.S. troops into the Arabian peninsula—a deployment 
that al-Qaeda propagandists decried as a sacrilege—and by providing al-Qaeda 
a grievance against the Saudi regime.
The U.S. unwisely did little to abate or prevent these conflicts. Since 1947 
the U.S. has sometimes moved to dampen crises between India and Pakistan 
but never pushed hard for an India-Pakistan peace settlement. It helped sus-
tain the civil war in Afghanistan for three years after the Soviet Union left 
Afghanistan in February 1989 by continuing to support rebels seeking to over-
throw the Najibullah regime. Then, when the Najibullah regime was ousted in 
1992, the U.S. abruptly disengaged from Afghanistan without trying to reconcile 
the Afghan factions that overthrew Najibullah. Instead the U.S. callously left 
them to war viciously among themselves. In retrospect the U.S. would have been 
better served by working to limit or end these conflicts.
Four current conflicts continue to complicate U.S. efforts to defeat al-Qaeda 
and stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction today. Together these 
conflicts pose a prime obstacle to U.S. efforts against the threat of WMD terrorism:
1.  Pakistan’s conflict with India causes Pakistan to fear the possible growth 
of Indian influence in Afghanistan. This leads Pakistan to continue aiding 
the Taliban insurgency against Afghanistan’s Karzai government.2 The 
Taliban insurgency now threatens the survival of the Karzai government, 
raising the risk that Taliban leaders who were once allied to al-Qaeda, 
and who remain ideologically friendly to al-Qaeda, could return to power 
in Afghanistan.
2.  Russia has fractious relations with states on its near periphery, especially 
Ukraine and Georgia. (Russian relations with Ukraine have lately improved 
but remain unsettled and could deteriorate again.) These conflicts are 
irritants in the U.S.-Russian relationship, as the U.S. has allowed itself to 
be drawn into the quarrel on the side of the near periphery states. 
Important U.S.-Russian cooperation on other key issues has suffered as 
a result. This includes U.S.-Russian cooperation to stem nuclear programs 
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in Iran and North Korea, to lock down loose nuclear weapons and 
nuclear materials worldwide, to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, and 
to stem global warming. All these problems are made harder to solve by 
U.S.-Russian friction over Russia’s relations with its near neighbors.
3. The Israel-Palestine conflict supplies al-Qaeda with a compelling propa-
ganda opportunity—a bloody shirt that al-Qaeda waves with great success 
to mobilize support.3
4. The Iraq civil war (2003–) has abated but still smolders, and it threatens 
to escalate again. It ties down thousands of U.S. troops, supplies al-Qaeda 
with fodder for effective anti-American propaganda, and sustains the 
risk that al-Qaeda could regain a refuge in Iraq by cutting a deal with 
one side in the conflict (like al-Qaeda’s deal with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan in the 1990s). There is also the danger that other states could 
be drawn into the conflict—a development that would benefit extremists 
in the region, including al-Qaeda.
Peace is therefore a key weapon against al-Qaeda and the WMD terrorism 
threat. More peace will bring less terrorism and reduce the spread of WMD.
II. Translating U.S. Leverage into Peace
Despite its current economic woes the U.S. remains the world’s sole superpower. 
U.S. military and economic strength is unmatched in the world, far surpassing 
the power of all parties involved in the four conflicts, mentioned above, which 
sustain al-Qaeda and impede progress against WMD terror. How can the 
U.S. use its power to persuade the belligerents in these conflicts to behave 
more peacefully?
Lesser states and nonstate actors often bend when great powers apply carrots 
and sticks. Israel, Britain, and France stopped their war on Egypt and withdrew 
from the Sinai in 1956 in response to arm twisting by the Eisenhower adminis-
tration. West Germany agreed to abandon its nuclear ambitions in the early 
1960s in response to U.S. assurances and threats—assurances that the U.S. would 
continue to protect Germany if it cooperated, and threats to end U.S. protection 
if it did not.4 Taiwan and South Korea likewise ended their nuclear programs 
in the 1970s and 1980s in response to U.S. promises to protect them if they 
complied and to punish them otherwise. The governments of emerging states 
in Eastern Europe agreed to respect the rights of their ethnic minorities after 
1989, under threat by the European Union that it would otherwise withhold 
economic relations. The Nicaraguan Sandinistas agreed to elections in 1990 and 
to leave power when they lost those elections under U.S. military pressure. The 
Serbs halted their war on Bosnia in 1995 under threat of continued U.S. aid to 
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the Bosniaks and Croats, and U.S. air attack. Other examples abound. Threats 
and inducements deftly applied can often turn ships of state in new directions.
Three types of leverage bear mention. They are: (1) Using threats or induce-
ments to broker neutralization agreements—that is, agreements ensuring that 
a state will behave with benign neutrality toward its neighbors. Such agreements 
can calm the fears of neighbors who may otherwise attack the state to fore-
stall its possible attack on them. (2) Using threats or inducements to persuade 
adversaries to refrain from using force or committing other belligerent acts 
against one another. This cannot end conflicts but can limit or abate them. And 
(3) using threats or inducements to persuade adversaries to settle their conflict 
by peace agreement.
The U.S. should apply these tactics to help to abate four current conflicts: 
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India, Russia-Ukraine-Georgia, Israel-Palestine, and Iraq.
III. Dampening Conﬂicts in South Asia
Public discussion of U.S. options in Afghanistan focuses on debating the size and 
duration of U.S. troop deployments to Afghanistan, the rules of engagement 
for those forces, and possible means to raise the legitimacy of the Karzai govern-
ment. These are important questions, but the problem of Pakistani support for the 
Taliban must also be addressed. Even a more legitimate Afghan government 
supported indefinitely by U.S. troops probably cannot defeat the Taliban as long 
as Pakistan sustains the Taliban with safe haven and material support.
 In principal the U.S. could address the problem of Pakistani support for 
the Taliban with either threats or inducements aimed at Pakistan. However, the 
threat option has large downsides. Its clearest downside lies in the danger that 
Pakistan may not comply, leaving the U.S. in a confrontation with a Pakistani 
government whose cooperation it needs in the wider effort against al-Qaeda.
 A more promising approach would seek to remove Pakistan’s motive for 
supporting the Afghan Taliban. As noted above, Pakistan backs the Afghan 
Taliban because it fears that otherwise Afghanistan will fall under Indian influ-
ence or control. Pakistan would then face the hazard of a two-front conflict 
involving danger of a direct Indian attack from the east, and a stab in the back 
by a pro-India Afghanistan from the north and west. Pakistani strategists see 
the Afghan Taliban as friendly agents who avert this two-front threat by steering 
Afghanistan away from alignment with India. (Pakistan’s fear of an Afghan-
Indian alliance is overblown, but this is how the Pakistanis see things.)
The U.S. could dispel Pakistan’s two-front fear by guaranteeing the strict 
neutrality of Afghanistan in all present and future conflicts between Pakistan 
and India. Specifically, Afghanistan would agree to have no formal or informal 
alliances with India; no military cooperation or coordination with India; no 
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military assistance from India; no outsized Indian consulates or military advisory 
groups on Afghan soil; and no Afghan military deployments against Pakistan 
in times of India-Pakistan tension or crisis beyond what Afghanistan might 
normally deploy on its Pakistani border. In exchange Pakistan would halt sup-
port for the Afghan Taliban insurgency and steer them toward peace. Pakistan 
would likely accept this bargain, as its motive for backing the Taliban would 
then be erased by the assurance of Afghan neutrality.
The U.S. would act as guarantor of the agreement. The U.S. could also seek 
agreement from Afghanistan’s neighbors, and from India, not to undermine 
Afghan neutrality.
Neutrality agreements have been successfully used in the past to calm conflicts 
by removing states from the international chessboard. Examples include the 1831 
Five Power Treaty to guarantee Belgian neutrality; treaties to ensure Russian, 
Austro-Hungarian, Italian and German neutrality under various scenarios in 
the 1880s; and agreements to guarantee Austrian and Finnish neutrality in the 
Cold War. Specifically:
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powers feared that another power (France) might move to control the 
new Belgian state and use its assets against them. Such thinking raised 
the risk of a conflict among the powers for control of Belgium. To avert 
this danger the European powers agreed in 1831 to guarantee that 
Belgium would be forever neutral. This agreement, the Five Power Treaty, 
lasted until Germany invaded Belgium in August 1914.5 For eighty-three 
years a struggle among the powers to control Belgium was averted by its 
agreed neutrality.
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ances in the 1880s that featured neutrality agreements as a key element. 
In the 1881 Dreikaiserbund agreement Germany, Austria-Hungary and 
Russia promised benevolent neutrality to one another should any of the 
three be at war with a fourth great power. In the 1882 Triple Alliance, 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy made the same promise of neutrality 
to one other. And in the 1887 Reinsurance Treaty, Russia and Germany 
promised benevolent neutrality should the other be involved in war with 
another great power, except for wars stemming from German aggression 
against France or Russian aggression against Austria-Hungary.6 These 
treaties helped keep Europe at peace by defusing states’ fears of being 
attacked, which dampened their impulse to forestall others’ attacks by 
launching preventive or preemptive war against them.
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Austrian accord in which Austria agreed not to join NATO, and the 
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Soviet Union agreed to recognize Austrian independence and withdraw 
all Soviet troops from Austria. This arrangement ended Soviet-American 
competition for control of Austria, pacifying that front in the Cold War.7
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Soviet demands that it agree not to join NATO, in return for Soviet 
acceptance of Finnish autonomy in its domestic affairs.
Thus we see that neutralization agreements have been effective means for 
calming international conflict in the past. The Afghan maelstrom seems an ideal 
case for the same cure. Afghanistan’s Karzai government will quickly accept 
neutralization, as (contrary to Pakistan’s exaggerated fears) there is no strong con-
stituency in Afghanistan for joining the India-Pakistan conflict. Afghanistan’s 
neighbors are also likely to cooperate with Afghan neutralization. Most impor-
tant, India should agree to its own nonalignment with Afghanistan because 
it gives up little by agreeing (as Afghanistan is unlikely to align with India in 
any case) and India would gain by helping its U.S. ally address the problem of 
Islamic extremism in South Asia.
In short, the U.S. could help solve its Afghanistan riddle by arranging the 
agreed neutrality of Afghanistan. Such a move could well persuade Pakistan to 
pull the plug on its Taliban allies. And without Pakistani support the Afghan 
Taliban would be far weaker than it is now.
The U.S. could also diminish Pakistan’s motive to support the Afghan 
Taliban if it could find ways to abate or end the India-Pakistan conflict, since 
Pakistan’s fear of India is what drives its desire to control Afghanistan. Two 
steps might be considered. First, the U.S. could make clear to both India and 
Pakistan that it will help the attacked party while ending any help to the 
attacker if either attacks the other. If the U.S. managed to make this threat 
credibly, both sides would be better deterred from attacking the other from fear 
of losing U.S. support and provoking U.S. opposition. They also could breathe 
easier knowing that their opponent would face U.S. opposition if it attacked, 
and is therefore unlikely to attack; so each would see less need to forestall the 
other’s potential attack by striking the other first.
A precedent for this approach lies in President George H. W. Bush’s suc-
cessful efforts to dampen the 1990 Kashmir Crisis between India and Pakistan. 
In that crisis Bush dispatched then-Deputy National Security Advisor (and 
current Secretary of Defense) Robert Gates to South Asia to warn both Pakistan 
and India that the U.S. would withdraw support from the more aggressive side 
if war broke out. To the Pakistanis Gates explained that the U.S. would “have 
to stop providing military support or any kind of support to whichever side 
initiates things.” To the Indians Gates then explained that he had told the 
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Pakistanis “not to expect any help from the Americans if they started a war,” 
and he firmly conveyed a similar message to India.8
The U.S. could also try to encourage India and Pakistan to agree to a final 
settlement of their long conflict. Specifically, it could frame an Obama Plan 
that defines a just and reasonable final-status settlement to the India-Pakistan 
conflict, and use threats and inducements to persuade both sides to accept it. 
The outlines of that plan are fairly clear.9 India and Pakistan have at times 
seemed ready to make peace themselves in recent years. Tensions between India 
and Pakistan arising from the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack preclude peace 
in the short term, but such an approach should be considered when conditions 
are ripe.
Such an India-Pakistan peace would lessen four U.S. security problems. 
First, it would ease Pakistan’s fears of a war with India, which would calm 
Pakistan’s fear that Afghanistan might take India’s side in such a war, which 
would reduce Pakistan’s motive to aid the Afghan Taliban. Second, it would 
remove Pakistan’s motive for supporting Punjabi terrorist groups, including 
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, that are friendly with al-Qaeda. 
Pakistan sustains these groups to attack India, especially in Kashmir, but these 
groups also give al-Qaeda ideological and material support. At long last an 
India-Pakistan peace might bring Pakistan to dismantle these al-Qaeda allies.
 Third, an India-Pakistan peace would allow Pakistan to remove military 
units from its eastern frontier with India (where Pakistan’s forces are now 
concentrated) and redirect them against al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban forces 
in Pakistan’s northwest. And fourth, India-Pakistan peace would allow Pakistan 
to reconfigure its army, now structured for armored war with India, toward a 
counterinsurgency posture appropriate for combating al-Qaeda, the Pakistani 
Taliban, and Afghan Taliban elements in Pakistan, should Pakistan opt to 
take them on (perhaps in line with the Afghan neutralization scheme outlined 
above, should it be accepted). As a result Pakistan could bring far more force to 
bear against al-Qaeda, its Pakistan Taliban allies, and perhaps even its Afghan 
Taliban allies. Given these benefits, India-Pakistan peace is worth pursuing 
despite the odds against it.
IV. Harmonizing Russia with its Near Neighbors
During the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations NATO was 
extended to include former Warsaw Pact states in Eastern Europe plus the 
Baltic states. The Bush administration later proposed to further extend NATO 
to include Ukraine and Georgia. Russian leaders responded by declaring that 
they view NATO’s approach to their borders as a threat to their national security, 
and have threatened to disrupt this NATO approach, perhaps by stirring up 
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civil war in Ukraine. Important Russian-American cooperation on other issues 
has been limited by this dispute.
A solution lies in the agreed neutralization of states on Russia’s periphery. 
Russia would agree to respect the domestic independence of these states; while 
these states would agree not to join NATO or another alliance that did not 
include Russia. NATO would join the agreement as a concurring party. Such a 
settlement would give all parties what they say they most desire. Russia would 
secure its frontiers, while its neighbors would ensure their own control of their 
domestic order. The U.S. and Russia could then get on with the important 
business of defeating al-Qaeda, halting the spread of WMD, and addressing 
climate change.
V. Dampening the Israel-Palestine Conﬂict
To prepare the ground for Israeli-Palestinian peace the Obama administration 
should propose a final status peace plan similar to President Bill Clinton’s 
December 2000 Mideast peace plan (known as the Clinton Parameters or 
Clinton Plan), and direct threats and inducements (mostly the latter) to both 
sides to persuade them to agree. This would strengthen forces on both sides 
that favor peace on reasonable terms, while pushing opponents of peace onto 
the defensive. It could thereby break the logjam and finally move the parties 
toward peace.
Polls have long shown that most Israelis and about half of all Palestinians 
favor peace on the terms like those framed in the Clinton plan.10 What has 
been missing is U.S. leadership to pull them over the line.
Clear U.S. willingness to apply pressure for peace would help moderate 
Israeli and Palestinian leaders make concessions, by making clear that the U.S. 
would give their opponents an incentive to reciprocate their concessions. In 
recent times moderates on both sides have held back from offering concessions 
from fear of being hung out to dry—exposed as willing to concede, with no 
results to show for their concessions. U.S. pressure would counter this fear.11
U.S. suasion for peace would also compel extremists on both sides to moderate 
their goals or risk losing support from their communities. Today extremists on 
both sides—Hamas on the Palestinian side, and the Israeli settler movement 
and its Likud allies on the Israeli side—pay no political price for depriving 
their communities of peace, because they can claim that their radical actions are 
not preventing peace, as there would be no peace even if they behaved better. 
Hamas used this argument with success in its victorious 2005-to-2006 election 
campaign. The U.S. can prevent this game by making clear that it will lead the 
region to peace unless the radicals disrupt it. It will then be clear to Palestinians 
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that Hamas really is preventing peace. Hamas will then be forced to moderate 
or lose support.
An Obama/Clinton Mideast peace plan would also help educate publics on 
both sides about the concessions that peace will require. Elites on both sides 
(especially the Palestinian side) have misled their publics to underestimate the 
concessions that peace will require. U.S. endorsement of terms like those that 
both sides accepted (albeit with reservations) in 2000 to 2001 will trigger 
discussions that will help restore realism in both communities on the need 
to make painful concessions.
Peace is impossible between Israel and the Palestinians in the short term. 
The split between Fatah and Hamas must first be healed, and Prime Minister 
Netanyahu’s Israeli government must first be reshuffled to expel its pro-settler 
elements and incorporate more moderate elements. But these are not insuperable 
obstacles. Moreover, an Obama/Clinton plan will help overcome them. The pro-
mulgation of an Obama/Clinton plan will put pressure on Hamas extremists to 
explain to the Palestinian community why they refuse a union with Fatah that 
could bring a positive peace, and will likewise force Netanyahu to explain to 
Israelis why he persists with a government that includes extremists and so cannot 
make peace when a just peace is finally available. Extremists on both sides will 
be put on the defensive. Their ability to veto peace will be weakened, perhaps 
sufficiently to allow peacemaking to proceed.
VI. Peace for Iraq
Regarding Iraq, the U.S. should frame a grand bargain that defines how to 
resolve the major outstanding issues that continue to divide the main Iraqi 
factions. These issues are: how to distribute power between the Iraqi federal 
government and provincial governments; whether and how to share power in 
the Iraqi central government among Iraqi political factions; where to locate 
provincial borders; how to share control of the Iraqi national army and other 
national security services among Iraqi factions; how to share ownership of oil 
and oil revenues among Iraqi regions and factions; whether to allow provincial 
governments to organize local militias and police; and how to define Iraqi 
national identity (how strongly Arab should it be?).
The U.S. has been in Iraq long enough to know what formulas on these 
issues are most acceptable to the various Iraqi factions. It should frame these for-
mulas and use positive and negative inducements to persuade the Iraqi factions 
to accept them.
The George W. Bush administration unwisely confined itself to mediating 
and cajoling the factions in Iraq. The Obama administration has so far pursued 
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the same impotent policy. Instead the Obama team should move more force-
fully to persuade Iraqis to settle their differences. The U.S. has vast leverage on 
the parties, including strong economic tools, powerful military forces in the 
region, and the capacity to arm and train the military forces of Iraqi factions 
that cooperate with U.S. policies. The U.S. could shape the outcome of an Iraqi 
civil war by arming and aiding one or another Iraqi faction. Hence no faction 
can dominate Iraq against U.S. wishes. The U.S. should harness this leverage to 
persuade the Iraqi factions to make the concessions that peace requires.
The U.S.-endorsed peace terms should reflect the principle that power and 
assets in Iraq shall be shared equally based on population. The U.S. government 
should then make clear that it will favor with assistance those who endorse 
these parameters and help foster a peace that embodies them, and that it will 
punish those who refuse to endorse these parameters, or obstruct progress toward 
a peace settlement that embodies them, by aiding their opponents.
Such a policy would leave all Iraqi factions better deterred from reaching 
for total dominion in Iraq. It would also leave them more secure in knowing 
that other factions could not achieve dominion (as the U.S. would not allow it), 
and that other factions therefore might no longer try to gain dominion. Hence 
all factions would be more willing to take the risks that agreeing to peace 
involves.12 All would be both deterred and reassured, hence more inclined 
toward peaceful conduct.
This approach to peace in Iraq finds precedent in Syria’s successful effort to 
coerce Lebanon’s factions to end their civil war in 1989 by compelling the fac-
tions to cooperate with a power-sharing arrangement framed by Syria. It also 
finds precedent in successful U.S. efforts to coerce the combatants in Bosnia, 
especially the Serbs, to end the Bosnian war in 1995. To do this the U.S. made 
clear that it would not permit Serb dominion in Bosnia. Eventually the U.S. 
armed the Croats and bombed the Serbs to compel them to accept an outcome 
premised on sharing power, and the Serbs complied.
VII. Using Leverage for Peace: Feasibility
To recap, I have suggested three ways the U.S. might use its leverage to limit or 
end conflict between or within other states: (1) to use threats or inducements to 
foster neutrality agreements that calm conflicts; (2) to use threats or inducements 
to dissuade adversaries from using force or taking other belligerent steps against 
each other; and (3) to use threats or inducements to persuade adversaries to 
agree to a peace settlement.
Are these remedies practical? We know from experience that the first rem-
edy, neutralization, is quite feasible. Neutrality agreements have often been used 
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to dampen conflicts in the past, with marked success. More questions arise 
about the feasibility of the second and third remedies. Possible problems 
include these:
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whichever belligerent behaves better, and shifts support from one bellig-
erent to another when their behavior changes. But the U.S. government is 
often too rigid for this. Instead, it sorts the world into good guys and bad 
guys, and then treats them as permanent friends and permanent enemies. It 
is not clear that Washington is capable of learning the more complicated 
habits of mind that these remedies require.
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the U.S. pursues an unjust peace. But past U.S. policies have sometimes 
been tainted by prejudice or ideology, or captured by foreign lobbies (like 
the China lobby of the 1950s, or today’s Israel/Likud lobby, Cuba lobby, 
Taiwan lobby, Georgia lobby, and others) that seek their own parochial 
goals without regard to justice.13 Remedies two and three—using threats 
or inducements to elicit peaceful conduct or agreement to a peace settle-
ment—requires that these influences on U.S. policy be kept at bay.
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officials agree on a U.S. peace proposal. But achieving this agreement in 
Washington would often be challenging, partly because the belligerents will 
mobilize opposing lobbies in Washington to promote their case, creating 
policy gridlock.
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ment has deep knowledge of the goals and perceptions of the belligerents. 
But this condition is often unmet. The U.S. State Department has been 
starved of resources for many years, leaving it short of expertise. American 
popular culture is insular; as a result most Americans know little of the 
wider world, so expertise is often lacking outside government as well. 
Hence Americans may be the wrong people to attempt difficult social 
engineering in faraway lands. Using threats or inducements to persuade 
others to agree to peace terms may be feasible in principle, but Americans 
may be the wrong people to try it.14
These objections warn that efforts at muscular peacemaking may not suc-
ceed. But the U.S. should try it nevertheless. The United States has a large 
national security interest in peace, and should run risks to pursue it, including 
the risk that muscular peacemaking might fail. The cost of pushing for peace 
without success is small, while the benefit of success is large. Hence the U.S. 
should apply its leverage for peace despite the fact that success is hardly assured.
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